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Introduction
Police stops, detentions, and arrests based on racial or ethnic profiling
have been widely condemned.1 Racial profiling refers to the use of an
individual’s race or ethnicity by law enforcement personnel as a key factor
in deciding whether to engage in enforcement action.2 In addition to
questions about its effectiveness as a tool of law enforcement,3 such
profiling raises the prospect of discrimination based on race or ethnicity and
differential treatment of individuals solely based on personal traits or
characteristics. There are increasing reports of police profiling based on

∗
This Article derives from a transcript of a presentation given on Friday, March 18,
2011, at the Traffic and War on Drugs Symposium, held by the Washington and Lee journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice.
†
Aaron Haas is the Oliver Hill Law Fellow and the Director of the Citizenship and
Immigration Program at Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Deborah Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2002) (stating that prior to September 10, 2001, a
consensus had been reached condemning racial profiling).
2. See John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 204 (2001) (explaining that race is
one of the factors police use when deciding whether to search cars).
3. See Heather Mac Donald, Op-Ed., Fighting Crime Where the Criminals Are, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2010, at A19 (noting the criticism from civil rights groups after the New
York Police Department released its annual data on stop-and-frisk interactions).
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Hispanic ethnicity,4 with indications that such profiling will continue to rise
in the future.
This concern is based on two inter-related trends:
the
criminalization of immigration enforcement and the localization of
immigration enforcement. Together, these trends mean that local law
enforcement—who are engaged in the vast majority of interactions
between individuals and the police—are increasingly focused on
finding immigration violators and treating them as criminal suspects.
In the past, local law enforcement traditionally saw itself as focused on
protecting public safety in the community, while the immigration
system was a civil matter of solely national concern.5 Today,
immigration enforcement is mediated through the criminal justice
system, and local and state police are encouraged to actively
participate in finding and detaining undocumented aliens.
In this paper, which is based on a presentation I made at this
journal’s spring symposium, I argue that ethnic profiling of the
Hispanic community has the potential to become a significantly greater
problem in the coming years. In Part I, I explain the criminalization of
immigration enforcement. In Part II, I will discuss the localization of
immigration enforcement. I will argue that the combination of these
trends creates the danger of profiling. In Part III, I will discuss how
these trends have manifested themselves in Virginia, focusing
specifically on an Attorney General advisory opinion that state and
4. See, e.g., Ann M. Simmons, Immigration Traffic Laws Criticized in Louisiana,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, at A16 (noting that a state law allowing police to arrest people
they suspect are illegal immigrants has been used primarily to detain Latinos).
5. The preeminence of the federal government in immigration enforcement was
established as early as the Chinese Exclusion Cases, the first major immigration cases to
reach the Supreme Court. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605–06
(1889) (noting that the ability to establish relations with other nations is a federal power).
The majority stated:
The control of local matters being left to local authorities, and national matters
being intrusted [sic] to the government of the Union, the problem of free
institutions existing over a widely extended country, having different climates
and varied interests, has been happily solved. For local interests the several
states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power. To preserve its
independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is
the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other
considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such
aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in
its national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.
Id.
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local law enforcement officers have Arizona-style authority to detain
undocumented immigrants. Finally, I conclude with ideas for how to
prevent or mitigate the potential for immigration-based ethnic profiling
and areas of further study.
I. Criminalization of Immigration Enforcement
Currently, more than 50% of all federal criminal prosecutions are
immigration-related.6 Between 2001 and 2009, the number of immigration
prosecutions in federal court more than quadrupled.7 In 2001, there were
16,310 immigration-related prosecutions.8 In 2007, there were 39,458 such
prosecutions,9 and in 2008, there were 79,431 criminal immigration
enforcement actions in federal courts.10 By 2009, that number jumped to
91,899, an increase of 463% in eight years and an increase of 133% just
since 2007.11 For example, in April 2010, there were 9,941 federal
immigration prosecutions.12 Customs and Border Protection—the agency
within the Department of Homeland Security that includes the Border
Patrol—initiated 7,822 new prosecutions in that month alone.13
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, charged with handling
6. FY 2009 Federal Prosecutions Sharply Higher: Surge Driven by Steep Jump in
Immigration Filings, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 21, 2009),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/223/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
7. Id.
8. Graphical Highlights: Federal Criminal Prosecutions Filed by Selected Program
Areas, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (2007), http://trac.syr.edu/trac
reports/crim/184/include/table_1.html (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
9. Backgrounder Southwest Border Security Operations, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/tracatwork/detail/A375.html (last
visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
10. Criminal Immigration Prosecutions Are Down, But Trends Differ by Offense,
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 17, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/227/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
11. FY 2009, supra note 6.
12. Immigration Enforcement under Obama Returns to Highs of Bush Era,
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Jul. 15, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/233/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
13. Id.
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deportations, initiated another 2,119 federal prosecutions in that single
month.14
This program is straining our federal criminal justice system through a
number of unintended consequences. For one, other criminal behavior is
being neglected because these prosecutions are using up so much of the
time of prosecutors, investigators, and judges. Thus, between 2003 and
2008, white-collar prosecutions fell by 18%, weapons prosecutions shrank
by 19%, organized crime prosecutions fell by 20%, public corruption
prosecutions dropped by 14%, and drug prosecutions declined by 20%.15
From 2003 to 2009, while immigration prosecutions increased 450%, to
91,899—the number of prosecutions for business fraud dropped from 322
to 82.16 As we now know, egregious abuses by the financial industry
during this period led to a severe economic crisis, and massive frauds like
that of Bernie Madoff went undetected and unprosecuted until it was too
late.
This crowding-out of other prosecutions in pursuit of immigration
violators includes violent criminal activity. The New York Times reported
last year:
The emphasis [on immigration crimes], many federal judges and
prosecutors say, has siphoned resources from other crimes, eroded
morale among federal lawyers and overloaded the federal court system.
Many of those other crimes, including gun trafficking, organized crime
and the increasingly violent drug trade, are now routinely referred to
state and county officials, who say they often lack the finances or
17
authority to prosecute them effectively.

United States attorneys on the Southwest border usually decline to
prosecute drug suspects with 500 pounds of marijuana or less—about
$500,000 to $800,000 worth.18 A federal judge in Austin, Judge Sam
Sparks, recently expressed his frustration at the increasing toll of these
prosecutions on his docket, writing “[t]he expenses of prosecuting illegal
entry and reentry cases (rather than deportation) on aliens without any
significant criminal history is simply mind-boggling.”19
14. Id.
15. Solomon Moore, Push on Immigration Crimes Is Said to Shift Focus, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2009, at A1.
16. FY 2009, supra note 6.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Steven Kreytak, Federal Judge Questions Immigration Prosecutions, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.statesman.com/news/local/federal-judge-
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The federal criminal justice system today is mostly about immigration
enforcement. In April 2009, for example, criminal immigration cases made
up the majority of new federal criminal prosecutions nationwide—about
9,037 out of 17,180—and outnumbered all white-collar, civil rights,
environmental, drug-related and other criminal cases combined.20 The
Department of Homeland Security accounted for 59% of all crimes referred
to federal prosecutors during that month.21 The reorientation of the federal
criminal justice system towards immigration enforcement can be seen in the
geographic disparity of the caseloads. Presently, just five of the country’s
ninety-four judicial districts handled 75% of all criminal cases in federal
district courts nationwide.22 These five districts are the five main districts
along the United States-Mexico border—Southern California, Arizona,
New Mexico, West Texas, and South Texas.23 The concentration of federal
prosecutions along the southwest border can only be attributed to the
dramatic increase in immigration-related criminal enforcement.
These immigration prosecutions essentially consist of being found
having crossed into the United States without permission. More than 90%
of the immigration-related federal prosecutions are for illegal entry or
illegal reentry.24 While it is not a violation of criminal law to be present in
the United States without permission, it is illegal to cross into the United
States without permission.25 Therefore, someone who has stayed in the
United States past an authorized period of stay by, for example, overstaying
questions-immigration-prosecutions-216667.html?printArticle=y (last visited November 3,
2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
20. Immigration Prosecutions for April 2009, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/
monthlyapr09/fil/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
21. Id.
22. See Russell Goldman, What’s Clogging the Courts? Ask America’s Busiest Judge,
ABC NEWS (July 23, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5429227&page=1
(last visited November 3, 2011) (explaining how the courts along the United States-Mexico
border handle a disproportionate amount of the country’s crime) (on file with the
Washington and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
23. Id.
24. Illegal Entry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (June 10, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/ (last visited
November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
25. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2011) (describing what constitutes improper entry by an
alien); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2011) (stating the criminal penalties for reentry by removed
or deported aliens).
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a temporary visa, has not violated any criminal law. On the other hand, a
person who has crossed the border into the United States without
permission has committed a crime, regardless of the length of time that the
person was improperly in the United States. This distinction in the law
means that criminal enforcement is strongly connected to border
enforcement, in which the violators are almost exclusively of Hispanic
ethnicity, as opposed to the broader diversity of unauthorized immigrants
from all over the world who entered the country legally but have overstayed
a visa.
Much of the increase is due to Operation Streamline, an “interior
enforcement” program designed to dramatically increase criminal
immigration prosecutions, often through large-scale raids followed by mass
plea bargains.26 Operation Streamline entails arrests made by federal
agents, primarily in the border region.27 Operation Streamline, and the
dramatic increase in federal immigration prosecutions associated with it,
has raised a number of concerns among scholars and advocates.28 The
resources entailed in this ambitious agenda have crowded out resources for
other kinds of cases and other criminal activity.29 The burden on the system
and the cost to taxpayers are also significant.30 The mass detentions and
prosecutions also raise issues of due process, including access to counsel.31
26. See Ted Robbins, Border Patrol Program Raises Due Process Concerns,
(National Public Radio broadcast Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=129780261 (last visited November 3, 2011) (providing a description of
Operation Streamline) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
27. Id.
28. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, OPERATION
STREAMLINE FACT SHEET 1 (2009), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/
images/uploads/OperationStreamlineFactsheet.pdf (last visited November 3, 2011)
(explaining that Operation Streamline takes away resources from other law enforcement
duties and criminal prosecutions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
29. See Goldman, supra note 22 (stating that critics claim Operation Streamline
prevents resources from going to the pursuit of more dangerous offenders).
30. See Ted Robbins, Morning Edition: Border Convictions: High Stakes, Unknown
Price (National Public Radio broadcast Sept. 14, 2010) http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=129829950 (last visited November 3, 2011) (quoting
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano as saying it is a “very expensive program”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
31. See JOANNA LYDGATE, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE OF RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND DIVERSITY, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE
1 (2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_
Brief.pdf (last visited November 3, 2011) (stating that the Ninth Circuit found conducting en
masse migrant hearings to be a due process violation) (on file with the Washington and Lee
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Many of the prosecutions are rushed, rely heavily on plea bargains, and
often occur with minimal access to adequate legal representation.32 As this
system expands beyond the border area to the rest of the nation, I believe
these issues will follow. Moreover, I believe additional issues will crop up,
particularly in the manner of detaining and arresting aliens accused of
violating federal criminal law. Local law enforcement will be primarily
tasked with arresting these individuals, and there is significant danger that
their efforts will be marked by increased profiling.33 It is this localization
of immigration enforcement, combined with its criminalization, which will
create the conditions for greater profiling of the Hispanic community by the
police.
II. Localization of Immigration Enforcement
Local law enforcement has been empowered to enforce immigration
laws, and their size and reach will make them the primary and front-line
agents of civil and criminal immigration enforcement.34 This localization
of immigration enforcement has occurred through a number of federal
initiatives.35 The Secure Communities program checks the fingerprints of
individuals arrested or otherwise processed by local law enforcement
against federal databases operated by the Department of Homeland
Security.36 Individuals who are positively matched as subject to deportation
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
32. See id. at 4 (stating that many defendants complete the criminal proceeding in one
day, with attorneys representing up to eighty clients in a single hearing).
33. See infra Part II (discussing increased profiling at the local law enforcement level).
34. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1996) (detailing circumstances under which local law
enforcement can arrest illegal aliens); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (describing how
the Attorney General can enter into memoranda of understanding with local law enforcement
to enforce immigration laws).
35. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (describing how
the Secure Communities Program operates) (on file with the Washington and Lee University
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-208 (1996) (discussing section
287(g) enforcement); Criminal and Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited November 3, 2011)
(detailing the tenets of the Criminal and Alien Program, and how Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) utilizes them) (on file with the Washington and Lee University Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
36. See Secure Communities, supra note 35 (describing the process by which
individuals are processed through the government system).
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are asked to be held by local jails until transferred to a federally-operated
immigrant detention facility, where they are placed in removal
proceedings.37 The 287(g) program, named after the section of the United
States Code from which the authority derives,38 takes the Secure
Communities program a step further by actually deputizing local law
enforcement to check immigration status of suspected aliens and detain
those determined to be subject to removal.39 The Criminal Alien Program
(CAP) stations federal Homeland Security officials at state and local
prisons and jails, or allows them to remotely monitor the facilities, to check
the immigration status of individuals processed through the facilities.40 A
large portion of aliens placed in deportation proceedings are located by
local law enforcement agents and transferred to federal immigration
custody through one of these programs. This use of local police, sheriffs,
and other non-federal agents is the essential platform upon which the
federal government’s immigration enforcement strategy is based.
The idea of these programs is to find undocumented or criminal aliens
who are being detained anyway for violations of the law in the areas where
they reside.41 The federal government can then take hold of the aliens after
the local criminal process has completed.42 However, even in the initial
phases of this effort, these programs appear to change the behavior of some
local law enforcement agencies in such a way that they target for arrest
individuals suspected of violating immigration law.43 That is, they are not
37. See id. (discussing local law enforcement procedures regarding potential
deportation).
38. See Pub. Law No. 104-208 (detailing the provisions of section 287(g)).
39. See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration
and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.
gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited November 3, 2011) (explaining how ICE
uses Section 287(g)) (on file with the Washington and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
40. See Criminal and Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (detailing how
the Criminal and Alien Program processes individuals) (on file with the Washington and Lee
University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
41. See sources cited supra note 35 (discussing the objectives of each program).
42. See id. and accompanying text.
43. See Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the
ICE Criminal Alien Program, POLICY BRIEF: THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE
OF RACE, ETHNICITY, & DIVERSITY, 1, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY (Sept. 2009)
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf (last visited November 3,
2011) (concluding that local police officers began targeting individuals strictly based on
racial appearance more often after the Criminal Alien Program changed from in person
review to remote access) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
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simply handing over undocumented or criminal aliens who happen to have
come into their grasp; rather, in at least some instances, they are actually
pursuing such aliens, often under the pretense of criminal investigation, for
the very purpose of handing them over to the federal government for
immigration enforcement actions.44
A study by the Earl Warren Institute at the University of California,
Berkeley, examined changing police behavior in Irving, Texas, after the
initiation of CAP in April 2007.45 The study found that in the following
three months, from April 2007 to July 2007, the number of traffic arrests of
Hispanic motorists increased 223%, from 48 to 155.46 Such a dramatic
increase in traffic arrests focused on a specific ethnicity in such a short
period of time is hard to explain in terms of local law enforcement.47 It
appears that local officers saw an opportunity to deport undocumented
aliens, using pretextual stops or heightened scrutiny to justify detention of
aliens who can then be transferred to federal immigration custody
regardless of the validity of the alleged underlying criminal activity on
which the stop was based.48
This misuse of local criminal arrest authority to advance an
immigration enforcement agenda appears to have occurred in other parts of
the country in the border region that has heretofore been the focus of these
efforts. Perhaps the most notorious example is the “sweeps” conducted by
the sheriff’s office in Maricopa County, Arizona, in which a large number
of agents descend upon a single area.49 While these sweeps were ostensibly
Social Justice).
44. See id. at 5–6 (illustrating the ways in which the local police target certain groups);
see also Sarah Mehta, Local Enforcement Tactics Lead to Racial Profiling, Human Rights
Abuses, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION BLOG OF RIGHTS (Mar. 29, 2011, 9:57 AM),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights-immigrants-rights/local-enforcement-tactics-leadracial-profiling-human-rights-abu (discussing the case of a woman who was questioned by
law enforcement because of her appearance and accent) (on file with the Washington and
Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
45. See Gardner & Kohli, supra note 43, at 1 (giving a brief overview of the Texas
study).
46. Id. at 6.
47. See id. at 8 (examining the number of traffic arrests).
48. See id. at 8 (giving examples of officers pulling over individuals for discretionary
reasons).
49. See Daniel Gonzalez, Sheriff’s Office Says Race Plays No Role in Who Gets Pulled
Over, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Oct. 5, 2008), http://www.azcentral.com/ news/articles/
2008/10/05/20081005arpaio-profiling1005.html (last visited November 3, 2011) (discussing
in detail allegations against Maricopa County police concerning racial profiling during
police stops) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
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focused on criminal activity, the patterns of detention and arrest indicate
that immigration enforcement may have been the true motive.50 The
Arizona Republic reported,
The records show that most people arrested were Latinos, even when the
sweeps were held in predominantly White areas. The sweeps frequently
targeted heavily Latino areas or day-labor corridors, and most of those
arrested during highly discretionary stops for reasons such as cracked
windshields were Latinos, the records show. Immigration enforcement
also seemed to be a main goal of the operations, which is prohibited: In
five of the eight sweeps, immigration arrests outnumbered other types of
51
arrests, the records show.

These federal-local immigration enforcement partnerships may be
encouraging the use of ethnic profiling.52
The twin trends of criminalizing and localizing immigration
enforcement have created a situation in which local police are encouraged
to target Hispanics for detention and arrest.53 This kind of profiling has
already been seen in the border areas, but, as the underlying trends go
national, it can be expected that profiling will also be increasingly seen
throughout the country.54 The situation is also ripe for exploitation by local
officials who have little understanding of federal immigration law, or have
a political or personal agenda in regard to illegal immigration. Recent
events by the Attorney General and others in Virginia illustrate these
concerns.
III. Virginia and Immigration Enforcement
In theory, the newly formed federal-local partnership for immigration
enforcement should not lead to an increase in stops, detentions, or arrests of
individuals suspected of being present without authorization. This civil
50. See id. (discussing the overrepresentation of Hispanic arrests).
51. Id.
52. See Gardner & Kohli, supra note 43, at 1 (“The Warren Institute’s study of arrest
data finds strong evidence that Irving police engaged in racial profiling of Hispanics . . . .”).
53. See id. at 4 (“[T]he Criminal Alien Program tacitly encourages local police to
arrest Hispanics for petty offenses.”).
54. See Gabriela Garcia, Philadelphia’s Police and ICE Collaborations Might Be the
Worst of All, CHANGE.ORG (Aug. 10, 2011), http://news.change.org/stories/philadelphiaspolice-and-ice-collaborations-might-be-the-worst-of-all (last visited November 3, 2011)
(lamenting the Secure Communities’ actions in Philadelphia amid fears that racial profiling
might occur) (on file with the Washington and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).

PROFILING AND IMMIGRATION

13

infraction alone cannot be the basis of police stops.55 Local law
enforcement is only supposed to check the immigration status of individuals
who have separately been detained for criminal violations, in accordance
with their normal job duties.56 The immigration checks are added onto an
otherwise lawful stop, but are not to form the original basis of the stop
itself.57 However, due to misunderstandings between the civil-criminal
distinctions, arguably augmented by political or personal agendas, there is
increasing evidence that the system does not work as planned in practice.58
In 2010, the Virginia Attorney General was asked whether local police
have existing authority to conduct Arizona-style stops of people suspected
of violating the immigration laws.59 His response, in relevant part, was,
So long as the officers have the requisite level of suspicion to believe
that a violation of the law has occurred, the officers may detain and
briefly question a person they suspect has committed a federal crime.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has found that so long as
the questioning does not prolong a lawful detention, police may ask
60
questions about immigration status.

This finding appears to say that Virginia law enforcement officers
have the authority to briefly detain an individual they suspect is in violation
of immigration laws and question him about his immigration status.61 Such
a finding would be consistent with the Arizona law, which says that “where
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully
present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when
practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person.”62

55. See supra text accompanying notes 43–53 (discussing examples of officer
rationale for police stops).
56. See id. (describing the job duties of local law enforcement as determined by
agency policy on checking immigration status).
57. See id. (detailing how immigration checks are supposed to operate under regular
police stops).
58. See Gardner and Kohli, supra note 43, at 1 (listing racial profiling as one potential
consequence of federal-local immigration partnerships).
59 See 2010 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 47, 1 (Jul. 30, 2010) available at
http://www.oag.state.va.us/Opinions%20and%20Legal%20Resources/Opinions/2010opns/1
0-047-Marshall.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Opinion] (stating that he was analyzing the issues
presented in response to a request for an official advisory opinion on the matter) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
60. Id. at 3 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01(2005)).
61. See id. (discussing the ability of Virginia police to briefly detain individuals).
62. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1501(B) (2010).
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However, a closer look at the operative language indicates that his
opinion is more circumscribed, consistent with the law, but articulated in
such a confusing manner that it will likely lead to improper enforcement.
First, he says that officers may briefly detain and question a person if they
have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed.63 This does
not apply to immigration violations because they are civil offenses, not
crimes. He then follows up that statement by saying that a person, once
lawfully detained, may be asked of his immigration status so long as it does
not prolong the detention.64 This claim is based on a case in which someone
was questioned while independently detained pursuant to a valid search
warrant,65 but it would not apply to someone stopped simply for suspicion
of violating immigration law (because such a detention would not be
lawful), nor would it ordinarily apply to questioning beyond what an officer
needs to ascertain whether a crime has been committed (because it would
prolong the detention).
It is true that law enforcement officers have the right to stop people
suspected of committing a crime, and it is also true that immigration status
can be examined so long as it does not prolong the stop.66 However, the
coupling of these propositions and the way in which they are worded lead
to a strong possibility for misinterpretation. Without sufficient parsing, the
opinion appears to allow for stops based on suspected violations of
immigration law and questioning about the same. Indeed, the Attorney
General’s opinion then combines these two separate propositions to reach
the inaccurate conclusion that Virginia officers have existing authority to do
what the Arizona law ordered its officers to do—stop and question
individuals suspected of being in the country unlawfully. He writes,
“Virginia law enforcement officers have the authority to make the same
inquiries as those contemplated by the new Arizona law.”67 This bold
conclusion rests on the propositions that the Arizona law is constitutional,
63. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at 3 (“So long as the officers have the
requisite level of suspicion to believe that a violation of the law has occurred, the officers
may detain and briefly question a person they suspect has committed a federal crime.”).
64. See id. (“[S]o long as the questioning does not prolong a lawful detention, police
may ask questions about immigration status.”).
65. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01 (2005) (finding that no independent
reasonable suspicion is needed for an officer to question an individual about immigrant
status).
66. See id. (concluding that when a detention is not prolonged, officers “[do] not need
reasonable suspicion” to inquire about “name, date and place of birth, or immigration
status”).
67. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at 3.
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which has been found not to be the case by the courts,68 and that Virginia
law enforcement officers have existing authority to do what the Arizona
legislation attempts to authorize. However, the Attorney General’s opinion
is almost certainly incorrect, and will likely lead to improper stops and
profiling of Hispanic motorists.
To understand why Virginia officers do not “have the authority to
make the same inquiries as those contemplated by the new Arizona law,”69
it is necessary to look at what the Arizona law actually authorizes.
Section 2 of SB 1070 reads, “[f]or any lawful contact made by a law
enforcement official . . . where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is
an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable
attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration
status of the person.”70 This provision has a few elements. First, it requires
a lawful contact. Presumably, a lawful contact occurs when an officer has
reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred—the standard set by the
Supreme Court71 and mirrored in the Virginia Attorney General’s opinion.72
Second, once a “reasonable suspicion” that a person is unlawfully present
has been established, the officer must make a “reasonable attempt” to
ascertain the person’s immigration status.73
This provision creates a few scenarios in which profiling could occur.
First, an officer could stop someone based on reasonable suspicion that he
has committed a criminal violation of the immigration laws. However,
illegal presence is not a criminal violation. Illegal entry and reentry are
criminal violations.74 This raises the question of how an officer in a state
far removed from the border, such as Virginia, could establish a reasonable
suspicion that an individual has entered the country unlawfully? It is hard
to see how such a suspicion could be established without use of a racial or
68. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz., 2010) (granting
a preliminary injunction against those portions of the law related to police stops), aff’d, 641
F. 3d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 2011).
69. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at 3.
70. S. 1070, 49th Leg., Second Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
71. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that stopping and searching a
suspected armed criminal is allowed under the Fourth Amendment).
72. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at 3 (“So long as the officers have the
requisite level of suspicion to believe that a violation of the law has occurred, the officers
may detain and briefly question a person they suspect has committed a federal crime.”).
73. See S. 1070, 49th Leg., Second Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (requiring law enforcement
officers to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the immigrant status of persons suspected
of being an alien).
74. See supra note 25 (describing the criminality of illegal entry).
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ethnic profile. The second scenario is that an individual is stopped on
suspicion of a separate criminal offense, but the stop is prolonged because
the officer has “reasonable suspicion” that the person is in the country
unlawfully. Again, it would appear that this suspicion would have to be
based on profiling. The final scenario is that an officer who suspects the
person is undocumented and wants to check his status uses a pretext to stop
him. Under any scenario, this provision enables and even invites profiling
from local law enforcement.
Local law enforcement’s new role as the primary enforcer of
immigration law will lead to profiling of not only undocumented
immigrants, but of Hispanics who reside in the country legally. They
face the prospect of more frequent police stops on suspicion of an
unlawful status, and longer police stops as their documentation is
checked and verified. The constant demands to “show one’s papers”
will itself constitute a form of harassment, and one that is particularly
objectionable to many Americans, as can be seen by the vigorous
opposition to any form of national identification card. 75 If a person
does not have documentation on him or is not able to quickly produce
the requested documentation, he faces detention or prolonged stops
that could significantly hamper his life. Moreover, there is no system
in place at the state and local levels to avoid repeated inquiries of the
same individual. That is, under this new legal regime, nothing would
prevent immigration status inquiries any time a person who generates
suspicion (through, for example, his accent or appearance) encounters
the police, necessitating a constant and ongoing pressure to
demonstrate one’s legal presence at any time.
It should also be noted that immigration status is often not clear,
particularly to local law enforcement officers who have little to no
training or experience in the immigration system. Some people may be
lawfully present and even known to federal immigration authorities,
but without documentation. A person seeking asylum, for example, is
known to the federal government and is permitted to be in the country
while his application is adjudicated. But he would not ordinarily have
documentation attesting to legal presence, nor would he fall into any
established category of legal status. Aliens who have been victims of

75. See generally, NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS: ESSAYS IN OPPOSITION (Carl
Watner & Wendy McElroy eds., 2004) (providing information and perspectives on the
opposition that has occurred in response to both historical and contemporary efforts to issue
a national identification card).
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crimes and are applying for U76 or T visas77 or self-petitioning under
the Violence against Women Act78 would be in the same category.
People who cannot return to their homeland due to natural disasters,
such as the recent earthquake in Haiti,79 may be under Temporary
Protected Status but without any documentation to satisfy non-federal
agents.80 Foreigners present under the Visa Waiver Program, under
which nationals of certain friendly countries are not required to obtain
a visa to visit the United States, may not have any relevant
documentation.81 Perhaps the most affected group is U.S. citizens,
who are generally not in the habit of carrying a passport or birth
certificate with them in the course of their day-to-day lives. The kind
of profiling likely to be engendered by these new laws will cause a
severe burden for many people.
It can also be expected that the problems identified at the federal
level in the border states will migrate to the state level as immigration
enforcement undergoes a similar migration. As mentioned above,
aggressive immigration enforcement through the federal criminal
justice system has been a burden on taxpayers, has crowded out
resources for other prosecutions, and has undermined due process and
access to counsel.82 As local police, prosecutors, and jails are asked to
play a significantly greater role in immigration enforcement, they will
have less time to spend on their traditional duties enforcing criminal
laws to promote public safety. A police officer who detains an
individual to ascertain immigration status will have less time to patrol
76. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)
(granting visas to qualified aliens who had been victim to serious criminal activities).
77. See id. (granting visas to qualified aliens who had been victims of human
trafficking).
78. See id. § 204(a)(1)(A)–(B), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)–(B) (allowing certain family
members to file a petition with the Attorney General asking for immigrant visas).
79. See TPS Designated Country: Haiti, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgn
extchannel=e54e60f64f336210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextoid=e54e60f64f33
6210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited November 3, 2011) (showing Haiti as a
country designated with temporary protected status) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
80. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. 1254a (2006) (giving the
Attorney General authority to grant an alien temporary protected status).
81. See id. § 217, 8 U.S.C. 1187 (2006) (listing the ways foreign visitors can be in the
U.S. without a visa or border identification card).
82. See supra Part I (discussing how the increase in immigration-related prosecution is
burdening the criminal system).
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and investigate criminal activity in his area. Jail space that would
ordinarily be used for people who commit crimes will be dedicated to
holding suspected illegal or criminal aliens on detainers issued by the
Department of Homeland Security. Local governments will be forced
to make difficult trade-offs or to pour more resources into law
enforcement in order to meet the additional burdens created by their
new roles as front-line enforcers of the immigration laws.
The new role of local law enforcement will exacerbate the
problems at the federal level and extend them beyond the border areas.
The significantly increased federal criminal dockets are mainly
confined to five judicial districts in the Southwest because the cases
are generated by federal enforcement activities in those areas,
particularly the Border Patrol.83 As local law enforcement take over as
the primary feeders of immigration violators into the federal criminal
system, the federal courts in the entire country will start to experience
the same problems as those in the Southwest. In Virginia, for
example, the new authority described by the Attorney General can
expect to locate more undocumented immigrants, many of whom will
then be transferred to federal custody and criminally prosecuted for
illegal entry or illegal reentry. The Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, based in Northern Virginia, which is
known for aggressive pursuit of immigration violators, has already
experienced some of this increase in immigration prosecutions.84
Whereas five years ago, this district ranked 21st in the country in
immigration prosecutions, it had moved up to 13th by 2009, and 9th in
2010.85 Bulging federal criminal dockets, almost exclusively due to
immigration prosecutions, will likely be a national phenomenon if
present trends continue.
To date, these trends have been marked by a rapid push to
significantly alter the nature of immigration enforcement with
insufficient thought put into whether this movement will lead to
83. See Goldman, supra note 22 (explaining that the increase in federal criminal
dockets is driven by five districts in the Southwest) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
84. See Immigration Prosecutions for November 2010, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 16, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/
immigration/monthlynov10/fil/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (describing the increase in
federal criminal immigration enforcement in Eastern District of Virginia) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
85. Id.
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increased profiling, and, if so, how to combat that tendency. In
Part IV, I suggest ways to determine the extent to which ethnic
profiling has increased as a result of the issues raised in this Article,
and things police agencies can do to ensure that their new role in
immigration enforcement does not lead to profiling.
IV. Proposals
Secure Communities and the other federal programs identified above
have been rapidly adopted by many jurisdictions throughout the country,
with little thought put into effectiveness, desirability, or collateral
consequences by the local law enforcement agencies asked to participate.
The Department of Homeland Security has established a goal of having
every jurisdiction in the country participating in Secure Communities by
2013.86 As of March 31, 2011, Secure Communities was activated in 1,315
jurisdictions in forty-two states, or 41% of all jurisdictions in the country.87
Virginia has been an enthusiastic proponent of this program, with all 129
jurisdictions in the Commonwealth participating in Secure Communities as
of June 15, 2010.88 In fact, Virginia is one of only a handful of states
outside of the border area that is fully participating in Secure
Communities.89
However, many jurisdictions have begun to question whether
participation in immigration enforcement is an effective use of limited
resources or if it may have a deleterious effect on other priorities, such as
fighting crime and establishing strong ties to the community.90 For that
reason, states and localities have been more willing to refuse to sign up for

86. See Activated Jurisdictions, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 1 (Aug.
2, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf [hereinafter
I.C.E.] (last visited November 3, 2011) (stating the Department of Homeland Security’s goal
is to have every jurisdiction in the country participating in Secure Communities by 2013) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 24.
89. See id. (indicating that Virginia has full participation in Secure Communities).
90. See Jason Buch, Unlike Texas, Some States Ditch ICE Effort Targeting Criminals:
Other States Leaving Secure Communities, But in Texas, Lawmakers Will Likely Expand the
ICE Program, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, (June 12, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/
houston-texas/article/Unlike-Texas-some-states-ditch-ICE-effort-1619438.php (stating that
“several northern states are dropping out of the program that matches the fingerprints of
those arrested against a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement database”).
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the program, or even to terminate existing participation.91 On May 4, 2011,
for example, Illinois announced that it was terminating its involvement in
the program.92 On May 27, 2011, the California General Assembly
approved a measure that would allow localities to opt out of participation in
Secure Communities.93 On June 2, 2011, New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo announced that his state would suspend its participation in the
program in order to weigh mounting evidence of its costs on local
communities and police agencies.94
These states join cities like
Washington, D.C.,95 San Francisco,96 and Providence, Rhode Island,97
91. See id. (providing an explanation for why states are not willing to sign up for the
program).
92. See Sarah Phelan, Illinois Pulls out of Secure Communities, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN
POLITICS BLOG (May 4, 2011, 8:03 p.m.), http://69-22-180-117.sfbg.com/politics/2011/
05/04/illinois-pulls-out-secure-communities (last visited November 3, 2011) (reporting that
Illinois planned to terminate its involvement with Secure Communities) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
93. See California to Let Counties “Opt Out” of Secure Communities Immigration
Program, FOX NEWS LATINO (May 27, 2011), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/
politics/2011/05/27/california-legislators-pass-let-counties-opt-controversial-securecommunities/#ixzz1O97ScUgi (last visited November 3, 2011) (reporting that the California
General Assembly approved a measure that allows local communities to opt out of Secure
Communities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
94. See Letter from Mylan Denerstein, Counsel to N.Y. Governor Cuomo, to John
Sandweg, Counsel to Sec’y of U.S, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 1, 2011),
http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/Secure%20Communities.pdf (last visited November 3,
2011) (announcing that New York planned to suspend participation in Secure Communities)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
95. See Renee Feltz & Stokely Baksh, The Anti-Arizona: As Other States Get Tough
on Immigration Enforcement, D.C. Bucks the Trend, THE AM. PROSPECT (May 4, 2010),
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_anti_arizona (last visited November 3, 2011)
(reporting that Washington, D.C. intended to cease participating in Secure Communities) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
96. See Brent Begin, San Francisco to Defy Secure Communities Immigration
Program, S. F. EXAM’R (May 5, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/05/sanfrancisco-defy-secure-communities (last visited November 3, 2011) (reporting that San
Francisco would begin releasing low-level illegal immigrant criminals despite federal
requests to hold them) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
97. See Gregory Smith, State Police Chief: Providence Decision on ICE ‘Dangerous’,
THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL (Feb. 24, 2011), http://news.providencejournal.com/breakingnews/2011/02/ri-state-police-chief-criticiz.html#.TsKDl2Cmkg9 (last visited November 15,
2011) (reporting that Providence Public Safety Commissioner Steven M. Pare asked
permission of the Department of Homeland Security for the city to stay out of Secure
Communities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
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which have also expressed an intention to withdraw their participation in
the program.
One important step for scholars and activists concerned with the
implications of these programs on potential profiling of Hispanic residents
is to gather empirical data on whether such profiling is occurring.
Anecdotal evidence from other jurisdictions indicates that profiling is
occurring, as mentioned above.98 However, more comprehensive studies
are needed. The facts that Secure Communities is a relatively new
program, has been activated at different times and in different places, and is
implemented in some places but not others, create opportunities for useful
study. We can look at how Secure Communities has affected arrest rates of
Hispanics in similarly-situated communities in which the program was
activated at different times. For example, Secure Communities started in
Fairfax, Virginia in March 2009, while it was implemented in Arlington,
Virginia in April 2010.99 Comparing the arrest and detention rates of
Hispanics during this one-year period in which the program was active in
one Northern Virginia community but not the other would provide useful
context.
A comparison can also be made between arrests of Hispanics before
activation and after activation in one locale. In the City of Lexington,
Virginia, the home of Washington and Lee University, for example, Secure
Communities was activated on June 15, 2010.100 We can look at total
arrests and arrest rates of Hispanics in Lexington in the year before
activation and the year after activation to see if the program encouraged
profiling in this city. Finally, we could compare total arrests, arrest rates,
and growth of arrests between states that have strongly implemented Secure
Communities and those that have not. While Virginia has activated Secure
Communities in all 129 jurisdictions, the neighboring state of Kentucky has
activated the program in only 1 of 120 jurisdictions.101 It would be fruitful
to see whether, for example, there is a higher rate of Hispanic arrests
relative to their portion of the population in Virginia in comparison to
Kentucky.
There is room for other kinds of research to determine the prevalence
and effect of immigration-related profiling. One big concern is that
98. See supra text accompanying notes 34–54 (discussing how the localization of
immigration enforcement leads to targeting Hispanic individuals suspected of being illegal
immigrants).
99. I.C.E., supra note 86, at 24.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 9.
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profiling stemming from the localization and criminalization of
immigration enforcement will damage relations between local law
enforcement and immigrant communities. It would be instructive to
determine if there has been a decrease in such cooperation, as evidenced in,
for example, a decrease in the reporting of crimes to local police by noncitizens. There has been a big push in the last ten to fifteen years to
encourage immigrants to feel safe about reporting crimes, especially
domestic violence, to local authorities.102 We need to study whether
domestic violence reports, arrests, and prosecutions have declined for
immigrant victims in Secure Communities jurisdictions since the time of
the activation of the program. This kind of information can be obtained
through statistical studies, such as the number of arrests, the number of
prosecutions, or the number of 911 calls. Alternatively, surveys can be
taken in immigrant communities and among law enforcement gauging
degrees of trust, cooperation, and willingness to report crimes and support
prosecutions of offenders among immigrants in the communities.
There are certain steps that law enforcement agencies can take now to
address the potential of profiling due to these changes. Local governments
should pass laws making clear that officers cannot arrest or detain anyone
solely to investigate immigration status. This is already the law, but the
confusing nature of many of these changes combined with misinformation
call for a clarification of police authority.103 Police agencies should also
make clear to immigrant communities through public education that victims
and witnesses from crimes will be protected from immigration enforcement
if they call on the police and cooperate with the police. Local police
agencies need to insist on dialogue with the federal government over
priorities instead of being a passive recipient of federal mandates. They
also must maintain a dialogue with immigrant communities, who may not
understand the role of the police and who may have misconceptions about
police due to experiences in their home countries. Local law enforcement
102. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (adding a number of protections for immigrant victims of
domestic violence to encourage them to go to the police without fear of deportation). The
act establishes the U visa for victims of criminal activity including domestic violence who
have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse and who have assisted or may assist in the
investigation or prosecution of the crime; allows victims of domestic violence to naturalize
even if the spouse did not live with the citizen abuser for the requisite period of time; and
makes other changes to laws to accommodate victims of domestic violence. Id.
103. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1968) (stating that law enforcement may
briefly stop and investigate an individual only when there is reasonable suspicion that the
person is involved in criminal activity).
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must also be vigilant in monitoring and investigating accusations of
profiling. Finally, local law enforcement agencies should promulgate clear
written policies and procedures for government interactions with
immigrants, so as to avoid any misunderstanding between the police and
immigrants.
Immigration enforcement traditionally occurred through civil
mechanisms at the federal level.104 Increasingly, however, immigration
enforcement is conducted through the criminal justice system and through
state and local law enforcement agencies.105 This criminalization and
localization of immigration enforcement is exemplified in Virginia by the
Attorney General’s opinion from 2010, which seems to call on local police
to stop and detain people suspected of violating the immigration laws.106
These trends create the potential for unlawful profiling, as illegal
immigration is often associated with the Hispanic ethnicity. Such profiling
can be avoided through changes in the law and police practice, but further
study needs to be done on this emerging issue. With the right approach, we
can enforce the immigration laws, keep police focused on fighting crime,
and protect the civil rights and liberties of all people.

104. See supra Part I (describing the criminalization of immigration enforcement).
105. See supra Part I (describing the criminalization of immigration enforcement).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 59–73 (discussing the advisory opinion of the
Virginia Attorney General).

